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PREFACE
A joint symposium between the Japan Society and the London School of Economics
and Political Science was held in the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for
Economics and Related Disciplines on 9 July 1999 to mark the centenary of Treaty
Revision in Japan. In the Bakumatsu period of the 1850s and 1860s Japan had
entered into a number of commercial treaties with foreign countries which (among
other things) gave foreign nationals extraterritorial rights in Japanese treaty ports.
These treaties were re-negotiated with the individual countries in the 1890s and the
new treaties came into effect in July-August 1899. Hence the centenary.
The four speakers covered the full period from the conclusion of the first treaties in
the 1850s to the re-negotiation of the treaties in 1911. Sir Hugh Cortazzi dealt with
the various initiatives which led to the first commercial treaties with Japan between
1853 and 1868. Dr James Hoare, in dealing with the working of the early treaties
and the attitudes of the foreign communities in the treaty ports, pointed out that the
treaties had been modified many times. Dr Nigel Brailey spoke on Sir Ernest Satow
who as British minister to Japan from 1895 was the  responsible official as the
’unequal treaties’ were coming to an end. He had earlier been minister in Bangkok
and knew how strongly the Thais wanted their ’unequal treaties’ revised at that time.
While the question of jurisdiction under the treaties had been largely settled, the
question of Japan’s tariff autonomy remained unresolved. Dr Ayako Hotta-Lister in
the final paper gave an account of how the Japanese, in a mood of increased
confidence after the Russo-Japanese war, ended the earlier treaties with a view to
concluding the Anglo-Japanese Tariff Treaty of 1911. By this re-negotiation Japan
secured tariff autonomy and improved the terms of the commercial treaty but
allowed concessions to Britain who had been her ally for almost a decade. Japan’s
struggle for treaty and tariff revision which had lasted almost half-a-century had at
last achieved its major goals.
We are grateful to the authors for allowing us to publish these papers.
November 1999
© by the authors. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.
1The First Treaties with Japan (1853-1868)
Sir Hugh Cortazzi
The British did not initially play a leading role in the opening of Japan. It was only
after the arrival of British diplomatic representatives in Edo in 1859 and of increasing
numbers of British merchants in Yokohama that Britain began to take the lead in the
development of foreign relations with Japan. The initiative was taken primarily by the
Americans and to a lesser extent the Russians and the Dutch. The French were not
far behind the British but their influence really only became important in the 1860s.
In the middle of the nineteenth century Japan did not feature significantly in the
formulation of British overseas policy. In the Far East the dominant issue for Britain
was China. The Treaty of Nanking in 1842 to which the Chinese agreed reluctantly
led to the opening of five Chinese ports, to the development of extraterritorial rights
for foreigners in the Treaty Ports and to the cession to Britain of Hong Kong island.
But the Chinese regretted the concessions they had been forced to make while
foreign merchants thought these inadequate. Hostilities between Britain and China
were renewed in 1856 and these led to the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858. British
resources in the Far East were also strained by the Indian Mutiny of 1857. In Europe
Britain and France were involved in hostilities with Russia in the Crimean War of
1854-1856. Britain also faced a crisis in 1856 in its relations with the USA as a result
of accusations that Crampton, the British Minister in Washington, had abused
diplomatic privilege in his recruiting activities in the context of the Crimean War
In the 1850s British merchants in the Far East were concentrating on trying to
overcome their trading problems in China and they did not see much immediate
prospect of valuable trade in Japan. There was, therefore, little commercial pressure
on the British Government to give priority to the opening of the Japanese market.
Despite popular perceptions of British imperialism at this period, official British policy
was in fact against the use of force in opening up Japan and British Ministers were
mindful of humanitarian considerations which might lead to criticism in Parliament.
They instructed British representatives to avoid provocative acts and the threat or
use of force. It was perhaps inevitable that in the climate of opinion among the British
2in the Far East who sought a quick way to riches and, in the absence of speedy
communications with London and of press reporting of their actions, British
representatives tended to exceed their instructions or at least interpret them in a
flexible manner.
When the British learnt of US plans for an expedition to Japan in 1852 they viewed
these plans with complacency. The Americans, since the opening of communications
to the west coast, had an obvious need for coaling stations and points of refuge in
Japan for their whalers and their ships involved in the China trade which had been
opened up for them by British action. The expedition of Commodore Perry and his
‘black ships’ has been covered in great depth and there is no need for me here to
describe the course of events up to the conclusion of the US-Japan Treaty on 31
March 1854 at Kanagawa and the exchange of ratifications at Shimoda on 21
February 1855. This agreement opened the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate as
refuges and sources of provisions, but interestingly not Nagasaki, despite the
existence of the Dutch settlement at Dejima in Nagasaki bay and the fact that most
foreign attempts to establish contacts with Japan had been made through Nagasaki.
Provision was made for the appointment of a US Consul at Shimoda. Article IX
provided for most favoured nation treatment, i.e. if the Japanese concluded with
other countries agreements providing for additional privileges these would also be
extended to the United States and its citizens. There was no provision for trade or
extraterritoriality although Article IV with its reference to ‘just laws’ was at least
ambiguous.
In February 1854 instructions were sent from London to Sir John Bowring who
became Governor of Hong Kong in 1854 about the opening of relations with Japan.
Bowring was authorised to commence negotiations if he saw ‘a reasonable
opportunity’ of success, but he was to give priority to trade with China and not to
leave China unless he was sure that British interests in China would not suffer as a
result of his absence. In negotiating an agreement with Japan he was to be guided
by the results of the American expedition. However, to quote Professor W G Beasley
in his valuable book,  Great Britain and the Opening of Japan (London, 1951), ‘the
exact terms he should try to obtain were left to his own judgement and local
knowledge’. He was, nevertheless, enjoined to ‘provide for British Jurisdiction over
3British Subjects’, ‘to stipulate for religious privileges’ and for ‘most favoured nation’
provisions.
Bowring did not feel that he could leave for Japan in 1854, but the Crimean War
gave Rear Admiral Sir James Stirling the reason for a visit to Japan. He concluded
the first British agreement with Japan in Nagasaki on 14 October 1854. Professor
Beasley has commented ‘that Stirling’s objectives differed radically from those
Bowring had been instructed to secure; that his results were disappointing to almost
everybody except himself; and that he negotiated without the authority, or even the
knowledge of the Foreign Office’.
An account of Admiral Stirling in Nagasaki is contained in J M Tronson, A Voyage to
Japan, Kamtschatka, Siberia, Tartary (London 1859). On 4 October 1854, the day
appointed for the Admiral to meet ‘the Governor’ (the bugyo) in Nagasaki ‘great
preparations were made on shore and afloat: on shore that he should not see too
much, and afloat that his boats should not stray too far’. The negotiations in
Nagasaki were complicated by problems of interpretation. The British used a
shipwrecked Japanese seaman called Otokichi as their interpreter whose English
was totally inadequate to convey the Admiral’s meaning. One of Stirling’s main aims
was to prevent Russian ships taking advantage of Japanese ports. The resulting
treaty was to say the least full of ambiguities. Nagasaki and Hakodate were to be
opened to British ships ‘in distress from weather or unmanageable’ (Article III), but
no mention was made of Shimoda. British ships were to conform to Japanese laws.
If they did not do so, this would ‘lead to the ports being closed’ (Article IV). Article V
was intended by Stirling to cover ‘most favoured nation’ treatment, but it was
obscurely worded. Article VII in the English version stipulated that ‘when this
Convention shall be ratified, no high officer coming to Japan shall alter it’. The
Japanese version used the term ‘ship’s commander’ for ‘high officer’ which at least
limited the article rather more clearly than the English version.
Despite the general lack of enthusiasm for Stirling’s agreement in London and in
Hong Kong, the Foreign Office decided to ratify it, no doubt concluding that it was
better than nothing and was at least a toe in the door. Ratifications were exchanged
in October 1855 in Nagasaki after attempts had been made to clarify the agreement.
4An ‘exposition’ of the agreement was handed over by Stirling to the Nagasaki
‘Bugyo’ and after extensive and fruitless argument English and Japanese versions of
the Exposition were exchanged on 19 October 1855. As Professor Beasley points
out, ‘although he [Stirling] did not know it, the Japanese version differed from his own
in one important point’. This dealt with the exclusion from MFN provisions of the
Dutch and Chinese privileges in Nagasaki prior to October 1854; this had become a
serious point of contention in the negotiations and no agreement had been  reached
between the Japanese and the British.
The Russians meanwhile had made some progress in their negotiations with the
Japanese. Their activities were curtailed by the need to avoid coming in contact with
British ships which, because of the Crimean War, were seeking to capture or destroy
them.  The Russian ship ‘Diana’ had managed to reach Shimoda but was damaged
by an earthquake there on 23 December 1854. This had put Admiral Putiatin, the
Russian leader, and his mission at the mercy of the Japanese, but perhaps because
the Russians were powerless to enforce their wishes and were accordingly humble
in their approaches the Japanese responded positively and on 7 February 1855 the
first Russian-Japanese Treaty was signed at Shimoda. This was prepared in
Japanese, Chinese and Dutch. It provided for the opening of Shimoda, Hakodate
and Nagasaki to Russian ships calling for supplies or repairs as well as ‘barter and
purchase of goods’ in Shimoda and Hakodate (though not at Nagasaki), reciprocal
aid and non-confinement of shipwrecked people, the appointment of a Russian
Consul when this was thought ‘indispensable’ at Shimoda or Hakodate, MFN and
significantly ‘reciprocal extraterritoriality’. But for the Japanese and the Russians
perhaps the most important clause was Article 2 which provided for the recognition
of Etorofu and the Kurile islands to the South as Japanese and Uruppu and the
islands to the North as Russian. Sakhalin was to remain ‘in common possession’. (G
A Lensen, The Russian Push towards Japan, (Princeton, 1959).
Reports of the British operations in China soon reached the Japanese and these
reports were used by Townsend Harris, the American Consul in Shimoda, to put
pressure on the Japanese to make concessions to the US in the commercial
negotiations which he was pursuing. His efforts were helped by those of the Dutch
Commissioner in Nagasaki, Donker Curtius, who also used the alleged British threat
5as a lever with the Japanese to conclude  in 1856 a Dutch-Japanese supplementary
Treaty of 40 articles. This latter agreement provided inter alia for trade to be
conducted at both Nagasaki and Hakodate and for a duty of 35 per cent to be
imposed on all goods sold. The Dutch were also authorised to pay in foreign gold
and silver coins.
The Japanese authorities under steady foreign pressure had ceded a good deal of
ground. There were strong disagreements among the Shogun’s advisers and much
anti-foreign feeling, but the Japanese were in a weak position. They did not have the
power to resist a strong foreign naval force. Moreover, some officials at least realised
that Japan could only become strong by adopting westerns arms and methods.
I cannot go into the details of the debate and struggles within the Bakufu. Nor can I
describe here the intricacies of the negotiations with Townsend Harris leading up to
the signature at Edo on 29 July 1858 of the US-Japan Commercial Treaty of 1858.
This was to set the pattern for the other treaties which followed. The most significant
provisions in the 14 articles of the Treaty were as follows:
Article I provided for the appointment of a US Diplomatic Agent in Edo and a
Japanese equivalent in Washington. They were accorded the right to travel
freely in Japan and the USA respectively.
Under Article II the President of the United States undertook to act as a
mediator in any differences between Japan and any European power.
Article III covered the opening for trade of other ports in addition to Shimoda
and Hakodate. These were Kanagawa and Nagasaki on 4 July 1859, Niigata
on 1 January 1860 and Hyogo (Kobe) on 1 January 1863. From 1 January
1862 Americans were to be allowed to reside at Edo and from 1 January 1863
at Osaka.
Article IV provided for the payment of tariffs as specified in the appendix to the
Treaty. It also forbade the import of opium into Japan.
Article V dealt with the use of foreign coins and permission was given for the
export of silver and gold Japanese coins.
Article VI provided for extraterritoriality. ‘Americans committing offences
against Japanese shall be tried in American Consular Courts’.
6Article VII covered the limits on the movement of Americans outside the
Treaty Ports.
Under Article VIII Americans were permitted the ‘free exercise of their
religion’.
Article IX covered the arrest of deserters and Article X the Japanese right to
purchase warships and munitions from the USA.
Article XI provided that the appended articles about the regulation of trade
were to be regarded as part of the Treaty while Article XII permitted the US
Diplomatic Agent together with person(s) appointed by the Japanese
authorities to make the rules and regulations necessary to implement the
provisions of the Treaty.
Article XIII dealt with the possibility of revisions to the Treaty being agreed
after 4 July 1872, while Article XIV covered ratification.
The Treaty was a considerable triumph for Townsend Harris, but it was certainly an
‘unequal treaty’, not only because of its extraterritorial provisions, but also because
of the limits it imposed on Japan in the conduct of trade. Ambiguities in the text of the
Treaty, perhaps inevitable in view of the diplomatic and legal inexperience of the
negotiators on both sides, ensured that there would be friction in the application of
the Treaty.
Hardly had the Treaty been signed than a British Misssion led by the Earl of Elgin
came on from China where the Treaty of Tientsin had just been concluded. To quote
Beasley, ‘Elgin did not know what he could accomplish in the time at his disposal’.
Baron Gros, the French envoy, who had hoped to accompany Elgin had been
ordered to stay in China. After brief visits to Nagasaki and Shimoda Elgin arrived off
Edo where he landed on 17 August 1858. Elgin had been ordered ‘to avoid the use
of force and hoped to avoid the threat of it’. Beasley comments that ‘Elgin had no
desire to transfer to Japan the methods he had found necessary in China… He
wanted to like the Japanese…He sometimes wondered whether Japan might not be
better without treaty relations, whether, indeed, treaties might not bring her only
“misery and ruin”’. In the circumstances prevailing in the Far East at the time Elgin’s
latter view was simply not realistic. It was becoming increasingly impossible for
Japan to remain isolated from the rest of the world. If the reopening of Japan had
been further delayed it is at least arguable that Japan would have suffered a worse
7fate and might even have suffered indignities similar to those imposed on China in
the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Elgin’s first need was to secure adequate access to the Japanese authorities.
Fortunately for him he had brought the steam yacht which Stirling had in 1854
promised to present to the Shogun and this provided a useful diplomatic entree card.
Another serious problem for Elgin was his lack of a suitable interpreter but Harris,
who doubtless reckoned that by so doing he would be fully informed of the conduct
and results of Elgin’s negotiations, agreed to make available his secretary Heusken
who spoke some Japanese as well as Dutch.
Elgin had been instructed to base his treaty on that concluded with the Chinese, but
this would have greatly complicated and extended his negotiations. He had no
alternative in the time available to him to accepting the American Treaty as a basis
for the British Treaty although ‘it was neither so detailed nor so generous as the
Treaty of Tientsin, but it provided an adequate foundation for commercial relations’.
As Beasley noted ‘it was only with difficulty that Elgin succeeded in making a few
alterations’. Article II left out any reference to mediation. Elgin ensured that the onus
for checking smuggling was placed on the Japanese and inserted an MFN provision
which surprisingly Harris had overlooked.
The regulations for trade in the appendix were almost identical in the two Treaties.
Exports were to pay a uniform duty of 5 per cent, imports of gold and silver were to
be admitted free of duty and liquor was subject to a duty of 35 per cent. To Harris’s
list of imports to be admitted with a 5 per cent duty Elgin succeeded in adding cotton
and woollen manufactured goods which were of particular importance for British
manufacturers and exporters of such products. On all other imports a duty of 20 per
cent was to be paid. The Japanese text was somewhat looser and vaguer than the
English text and in the MFN clause the reference to preexisting privileges was
omitted, but, whereas in Admiral Stirling’s agreement this omission was potentially
significant, it was now immaterial in view of the Dutch-Japanese Treaty of 1857.
The French concluded their Treaty with Japan in October 1858.
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post as Consul General. He soon found it desirable to enhance his status as a
diplomatic agent and had himself appointed as Minister to Japan. His biggest
problems arose from the weakness, vacillations, prevarications and deceptions of
the Japanese authorities with whom he had to deal, but he was also not helped by
the greed of, and sleaze prevailing among, the first British merchants who came to
Japan. Relations started badly as the Japanese, who feared that trouble would soon
occur if the foreign community were established at Kanagawa which lay on the main
Tokaido,  decided to move the proposed settlement to the little fishing village of
Yokohama nearby where they could easily control entry and exit to the settlement.
Alcock protested to no avail especially as the first British merchants readily accepted
the new location and the buildings provided by the Japanese.
While the Treaties provided for diplomatic agents to reside in Edo and for the
opening of Treaty Ports, nothing was said about responsibility to protect the
diplomatic agents and foreign nationals. Even if this responsibility had been spelt out
the fact was that the Bakufu authorities were not in command of the situation.
Hostility towards the foreigners whose customs and behaviour made them seem
particularly alien was fomented by opposition to the Bakufu itself. The British
Legation which Alcock had established at Tozenji in Shinagawa in 1859 was
attacked by ronin in the summer of 1861 (and again the following year while Alcock
was on home leave). The British protests to the Japanese authorities and the
decision to withdraw temporarily to Yokohama in 1861 exacerbated the increasingly
chilly relations between Alcock and Harris and led to an acrimonious and public
quarrel. Heusken, Harris’s interpreter, was murdered and there were frequent
attacks on foreigners in Yokohama. This led to the establishment of temporary
foreign garrisons (English and French) in Yokohama for which there was no
provision in the Treaties.
The lack of security for foreigners in Japanese Treaty Ports was a major factor in
inducing Alcock to recommend that concessions be made to the Japanese mission
to Europe which he accompanied in 1862. On 6 June 1862 the so-called London
protocol was signed by the Japanese Envoys and the British Foreign Secretary. The
protocol deferred for five years the opening for trade of Niigata and Hyogo (Kobe)
9and the opening for residence of Edo and Osaka. In return for this concession the
Japanese agreed to abolish ‘all restrictions, as regards quantity or price, on the sale
by Japanese to foreigners of all kinds of merchandise’. Other articles abolished
restrictions on the hire of Japanese labour and other restrictions limiting trade in the
Treaty Ports as well as ‘restrictions imposed on free intercourse of a social kind
between foreigners and the people of Japan’. If the Japanese failed to abide by
these terms the British reserved the right to withdraw their concessions on deferring
the opening of the ports. The British also won a reduction in the duties on wines and
spirits and the addition of glass ware to the list of products subject to a 5 per cent
import duty.
The London Protocol did not prevent a deterioration in British relations with Japan as
a result of the Namamugi incident of September 1862 when Richardson, a British
merchant from Shanghai, was murdered on the Tokaido near Yokohama by samurai
belonging to the train of Shimazu Hisamitsu of Satsuma. The British demanded the
punishment of the assassins and compensation from Satsuma. The Bakufu who
were in no position to force the satsuma clan to comply prevaricated and in the
following year a British fleet bombarded Kagoshima destroying half the town. The
story of the incident and the subsequent problems with the Choshu fief over freedom
of navigation through the straits of Shimonosaeki lie outside the scope of this brief
discussion of the Treaties, but they underline the inadequacies of these agreements
in attempting to regulate relations between Britain and Japan.
The Treaty article on the use of foreign coins and the export of specie was a major
cause of dispute in the early 1860s. At that time outside Japan gold was worth
roughly fifteen times the value of silver whereas in Japan it was worth five to ten
times as much. Although this disparity was fairly quickly rectified the Japanese failed
to achieve a stable exchange between their own coins and the Mexican silver dollar
which was the generally recognised currency used in trade in the Far East at that
time.  The Japanese attempted to regulate the supply to foreigners (officials who had
a preferential rate and foreign merchants) of Japanese silver coins (ichibu) which
could be used to buy up Japanese gold coins for export. British merchants greedily
demanded huge amounts of Japanese silver coins and used fictitious names,
sometimes of a 'ribald character’, in pursuit of their claims. This is not the occasion to
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discuss the currency problem in any detail, but the inadequacy of the formulation of
Article V of the US-Japan Treaty of 1858 soon became apparent.
Article VI, however, which provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction (extraterritoriality)
came to be the most sensitive issue in western relations with Japan in the latter part
of the nineteenth century and to underline the ‘unequal’ nature of the treaties. But
there were some cogent arguments for extraterritorial rights for foreigners in Japan
at this time. The Japanese commonly used torture in the treatment of suspects and
punishments were even less ‘civilized’ than those carried out in western countries.
There was also no properly promulgated criminal or civil code. If foreign merchants
had been illtreated by Japanese in ways similar to those used in nineteenth century
China the outcry in Britain would have been such that the government could not
have avoided taking such countermeasures against Japan as would have caused a
greater loss of Japanese sovereignty and animosity than was in fact the case, even
bearing in mind the British retaliation against Satsuma.
The story of the early treaties with Japan would not be complete without a brief
mention of the abortive Paris Convention of 1864 in which the Japanese envoys then
in Paris had undertaken to open the port of Shimonosaeki. This undertaking which
the Bakufu could not in any case have enforced was rejected by the authorities in
Edo. The problem of free navigation through the straits of Shimonosaeki was
concluded by a four-article convention signed in Yokohama on 22 October 1864
between the representatives of the Japanese government and the representatives of
Great Britain, France, the United States and the Netherlands. This provided for the
payment of an indemnity of three million dollars or, if the Shogun preferred, ‘the
opening of Shimonosaeki or some other eligible port in the Inland Sea’.
The British attack on Kagoshima in 1863 aroused significant criticism and opposition
in the British Parliament. Her Majesty’s consular officers in carrying out their judicial
activities were not immune from criticism or from the oversight of the proper judicial
authorities. For instance the case of Michael Moss in 1860 caused considerable
embarrassment to Rutherford Alcock. Moss had been apprehended shooting a wild
goose outside the area of Yokohama settlement. He had a rough time at the hands
of the Japanese authorities.This aroused the sympathy of British residents. When he
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came before the consular court he was fined 1000 dollars and ordered to be
deported. Alcock who was outraged at the leniency of the sentence added three
months in jail to Moss’s sentence. After only five days in jail Moss got away to Hong
Kong where he sued Alcock for wrongful imprisonment and was awarded 2000
dollars in damages.
The trade and tariff clauses of the Treaties were another serious cause of friction
between the Japanese and the western powers. Unequal they would remain but Sir
Harry Parkes, who took over from Alcock as British Minister in Japan in 1865, was
determined from the time of his arrival to simplify and improve the tariff and trade
arrangements. This he eventually achieved and agreements (kaizei yakusho) were
signed in Edo between the Japanese and western envoys, led by Parkes, on 25
June 1866. Under the terms of the agreement the import tariffs which had been set
in the 1858 Treaties at 5 to 35 per cent of the average selling price were reduced to
a uniform 5 per cent of the declared value to be paid in silver. The Kodansha
Encyclopedia of Japan adds: ‘The agreement further abolished charges on foreign
ships entering and leaving Japanese ports, allowed construction of foreign
warehouses in Japanese cities, and exempted foreign goods from domestic
transport duties. It greatly weakened the shogunate’s control of foreign trade and at
the same time deprived it of revenues, especially with the fall in the price of silver’.
All the agreements which I have attempted to summarise were, of course, concluded
with the Bakufu (shogunate). The key issue for Sir Harry Parkes and the foreign
envoys was that of ratification by the Mikado. This was the issue which dominated
the final years of the Bakufu and which was to be one of the main elements in
bringing about the Meiji Restoration of 1868. A review of the process of achieving
imperial ratification goes far beyond the scope this short talk. Suffice it to say that
‘imperial consent’ to the treaties was conveyed in a letter from Okubo Toshimichi to
Saigo Takamori and Minoda Denbei from Kyoto dated 24 November 1865 (Select
Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853-1887) by W G Beasley (OUP, 1955)
and officially conveyed to the British Minister on the same day.
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Japan’s Treaty Ports And Treaty Revision - Delusions Of Grandeur?
J E Hoare
This paper examines the way the foreign community in Japan’s treaty ports viewed
the issue of treaty revision. From the start, however, there are difficulties.  One is the
very notion of treaty revision, for the ink was scarcely dry on any particular treaty
before there were calls for its revision.  This was so from the beginning. The wider
trading community of East  Asia found fault with both the Perry and the Stirling
conventions, and this led to their replacement in the series of treaties began in 1858
and culminating in the Austro-Hungarian Treaty of 1869. All these linked in with each
other, through the imaginative use of the ‘most favoured nation clause’, so that the
benefits of one treaty automatically went to the other treaty powers. The last treaty
mentioned, the Austro-Hungarian, was a good example of this in operation, for it was
in effect, a second British treaty.  Austro-Hungarian interests in Japan in 1869 were
of the most limited kind, and remained so for the whole period of the  ‘unequal
treaties’, but Sir Harry Parkes, who happily supplied a draft, used the opportunity to
extend further foreign claims to exemption from Japanese jurisdiction1.
But even these treaties were in the process of revision from the start. In the British
case, the London Protocol of 1862 provided for a major revision of the 1858 treaty,
with the postponement of the opening of  Niigata, Hyogo, Edo and Osaka. A further
revision took place in 1866, with the reduction of the tariff and the removal of
controls on coastal shipping. From 1872 onwards, the Japanese gave notice that
they wanted the treaties, now increasingly seen in Japanese eyes as the ‘unequal
treaties’, revised in their favour. Most western governments and their subjects in the
treaty ports and cities did not treat this demand seriously at first. Before long the
Japanese voices could not be ignored, even though the Japanese showed
themselves quite willing to try to impose similar ‘unequal treaties’ unsuccessfully on
China in 1872 but successfully on Korea in 1876.  By then,  it was clear what the
foreign communities of the treaty ports were concerned with when they talked about
treaty revision. Earlier changes in the treaties were seen by foreigners as largely in
their favour - although there was some questioning of the failure to open the ports in
1862  - and they were happy with this. No doubt at the back of many a treaty port
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resident’s mind was the precedent of China, and the way that China’s problems had
proved to be foreigners’ opportunities.  ‘Treaty revision’ like the expansion of the
Shanghai Municipal Council might be welcome. There were indeed those who
followed that line; Thomas Blakiston’s insistence on his ‘right’ to issue paper money
at Hakodate in 1875, in clear defiance of the new, Western-style banking Japanese
laws,2 was perhaps an extreme example, but the attitude was common. It was
becoming clear by the mid- to late-1870s, however,  that the Japanese might not
have in mind the preservation and expansion of foreign interests when they sought
to revise the treaties.
With the emergence of this Japanese voice, a somewhat querulous tone began to
enter foreign discourse on the subject. Earlier events had left the foreign
communities with a very strong sense that they were ‘the West’ when it came to
dealing with Japan; perhaps what one might call the ‘last outpost of civilisation’
syndrome. There was no question here of recognising in either China or Japan
states that were civilised, even if different. These were barbarians; indeed, the
foreign press not infrequently talked in terms of dealing ‘with barbarian empires’.3
This view was perhaps strongest among the British; whatever views British
diplomats and consuls held of their fellow countrymen, they tended to keep to
themselves - Sir Rutherford Alcock was a notable exception - and the result was that
the British community was not disabused of the idea that their interests were
paramount and should come before all else.4  In this atmosphere, the British
merchants became convinced that their rights and privileges were all that mattered.
They wanted extraterritoriality and the comfort of their own legal system; they should
have it. Trade and trade interests, in these circumstances, became very narrowly
defined, limited in the treaty port eyes to that carried on in the small world of
Yokohama or Kobe. It would be hard to find any wider vision, even as Japan began
its rapid industrialisation and development. For most of their forty-year existence, the
foreign communities of the Japanese treaty ports seemed to remain trapped in a
time warp, as they failed to see that what the Japanese had been forced to accept in
1858 was being seen as an infringement of sovereignty by 1872, and as an outrage
by 1890.
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This leads to another problem. What exactly was the treaty port voice?  Thirty years
ago, I thought I knew. It was to be found in the foreign language press of the treaty
ports, in the newspapers produced in London and elsewhere to serve the needs of
the foreign communities in East Asia, occasionally in the few company archives that
were available, and in the correspondence sent to consuls, ministers and to foreign
ministries.  So I wrote as though the material so read was the authentic voice of the
foreign community.  I still think that it is a partial voice, but I am less convinced that
we have anything like a whole picture of views.5
The problem is partly that we have no other voices. For much of the period from,
say, 1870 to the mid 1880s, there is little comment from outside the treaty port
community.  On the Japanese side, Baba Tatsui is a lone exception, but he was
downgraded as a commentator because he was Japanese and, for a time, very
much an isolated example of a critical voice.6  Later the Japanese press, which had
quickly outstripped any foreign leading strings and had become a powerful
instrument in its own right, would take up the cause of opposition to the treaties, but
there is little sign that this affected foreign views. Beyond that, and on the foreign
side,  it is not easy to find dissenting views about the value of the treaties and the
need to preserve them intact as far as possible.
 Some missionaries raised the issue, but they were few and far between, and usually
did so in journals that would not have been seen in the ports and but rarely came to
the attention of foreign ministers, never mind foreign ministries far away.  If such
views were given a wider airing, as happened to the American missionary D. C.
Greene’s comments about the iniquities of extraterritoriality, they were dismissed as
being of no consequence. How could such views, coming from a missionary, and an
American at that, override those of  merchants, the really important part of the
foreign community, especially since Greene’s views had originally appeared in the
pages of the Japan Mail, whose editor was believed to be in Japanese pay?7
As the years passed, a number of foreign diplomatic and consular staff, in at least
the British and American services, came to believe that the 1858 treaty system was
old-fashioned and cumbersome. It certainly did not appear to be of much help to
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wider national interests, even if it was valued by those in the treaty ports. By and
large, however, such views appear to have remained hidden in the official records,
and not made known to their fellow citizens.8
One significant absence from the debate is the views of the major trading
companies. In the early days of the Japanese ports, members of the major
companies such as Jardines had been active in the ‘town meetings’ that regularly
took place over issues such as security, the iniquities of the Japanese customs, and
related matters. In addition, at least William Keswick, first head of Jardines in Japan,
was a strong private critic of the actions and views of the first British minister, Sir
Rutherford Alcock.9  By the 1880s, public participation by members of the bigger
companies in public meetings, such as there were, appears to be rare. While happy
to discuss the price of rice, or the difficulty of preparing tea for export, Jardines’
representatives seem to have been unwilling to discuss issues such as
extraterritoriality or treaty revision in public; certainly few indications of Jardines’
views on this issue appear to have survived. And yet, it is hard to conceive that a
company with such wide interests as Jardines did not have views.  Perhaps its
directors felt that it would be best if Jardines’ views were wrapped up in other
people’s packages; they were careful to avoid being associated with such shrill
comments as came from the Japan Herald or the Japan Gazette, and seem to have
taken no part in the protest meetings that marked the 1889-90 period. Perhaps also
Jardines had no need to make its views known in public at least while Sir Harry
Parkes was British minister in Japan, given that there was clearly a closeness
between the Parkes and the Keswick families, and that the Keswicks were
prominent in Jardines.10
Another absence is the non-British voice.  In the first half of the period, from 1859 to
the late 1870s, such evidence as there is points to a fairly united view of the
question amongst all the Westerners. All shared the view that Japan was barbaric
and that foreigners needed protection. All seem equally of the view that if there was
a need for change in the treaties, it was in the direction of removing Japanese
control over tariffs and ending what were seen as a Japanese government policy of
restrictions on trade. The official representatives of France in Japan were as
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determined as Sir Harry Parkes in their views of the need for extraterritoriality, a
stand that encouraged French residents to adopt a similar view. The French-
language newspapers published at Yokohama in the late 1870s though never so
influential as the British, had a similar hostility to Japanese aspirations. The French-
language newspapers published at Yokohama in the late 1870s though never so
influential as the British, had a similar hostility to Japanese aspirations, even if it was
not usually expressed in such strident tones.11
This united front did not last. As early as 1873, the small Italian community seemed
prepared to give up some of the protection offered by extraterritoriality to gain
access to the silk markets inland from the ports.  Under pressure from the other
powers, the Italians backed away, but it was a sign that the unity of the early days
might be on the point of break-up.  In 1878, similar terms were offered to American
citizens, but although the American government was increasingly sympathetic to
Japan, there was no breakthrough. The other powers indicated that if the US treaty
went ahead, they would claim the same rights by means of the most favoured nation
clause, but would not concede the Japanese claim to exercise jurisdiction over
foreigners.12
The dominant voice of the treaty ports in Japan, as in China, was British.  Apart from
the almost silent Chinese, the British were the largest foreign group in Japan until
the First World War.  They were the biggest traders and the main bankers. British
shipping commanded the coastal trade. The foreign-language newspapers were for
the most part British-owned and edited. Of all the powers Britain had the most
elaborate and most efficient diplomatic and consular establishment, and only Britain
made full provision for the operation of the extraterritoriality system. Not surprisingly,
perhaps, the British community came to believe that their interests were more
important than those of other foreigners, and if the treaty port system was working
for them, what did it matter that it did not work so well for others?
There were other considerations as well. To the British, there was a seamless
connection between what happened in Japan and what happened in China and, less
well worked out, possible consequences in India and the growing British empire in
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eastern Asia.  Many of the Britons who lived and worked in Japan came there from
China or from other parts of the British empire; Australians and Canadians still
counted themselves as British, and others saw them as such. The view was
frequently expressed in the press that, whatever the merits of the Japanese case for
a change in the treaty arrangements - not that there was much willingness to
concede that there was such a case - it would be too dangerous to begin unravelling
the system for fear of what it would do to the much greater British interests in China.
Similar arguments can be found in the British official correspondence. (Other
foreigners seem to have felt the same, although Dr Richard Sims has pointed out
that he has found no evidence that French officials shared the same view.13)
In effect, therefore, the British treaty port community came to believe that only
revisions of the treaties that might benefit foreigners should take place. Low tariffs -
and if possible even lower tariffs - would be welcome; the right to travel in the interior
would be welcome, and indeed a test of Japanese sincerity in modernisation, but of
course foreigners should remain under their own jurisdiction, since Japanese
jurisdiction was not to be trusted, and so on.  In support of this position, the British
could turn to Sir Harry Parkes, whose views of the Japanese wishes appeared to
coincide firmly with their own, and whose robust dealing with the Japanese
authorities, a robustness that lost nothing in the telling, was widely praised, and
whose departure for China in 1883 was sadly mourned. 14
When it became clear that the Japanese would not concede to foreigners on tariffs
and other matters without some diminution of foreign privileges, the reaction of the
British merchant community was to retreat into their shell and, effectively, to claim
that if they could not have change on their terms, then there should be no change.
Japan’s modernisation was never enough. The new legal codes did not represent a
real change of heart on the part of the Japanese, whom it was claimed, secretly
clung to their old clandestine ways. That the Japanese had introduced a new legal
system based on that prevailing in much of Western Europe rather than one based
on the Anglo-Saxon system was another cause of grievance. How could true-born
Englishmen (Scots and others were presumably subsumed in this term) submit to
codes that did not include the jury system, thundered (Yokohama newspapers
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always seemed to thunder) the Japan Gazette  in 1881, a system introduced by
Alfred the Great, which had needed no change for a thousand years? 15  Many
agreed with the sentiments expressed by the former Yokohama lawyer, F. V.
Dickins, in 1892 at the London Congress of Orientalists, that Japan could not really
be regarded as a fully modern state until it abandoned the Japanese language.
Dickins did not argue that until that happened, there should be no change in the
treaty structure, but such views were not unknown.16
By the early 1880s, however, extraterritoriality in Japan was already beginning to
creak at the seams, with the Japanese mounting a series of successful attacks on it.
Even Sir Harry Parkes was forced into retreat, as his own Foreign Office accepted
crucial Japanese interpretations of the treaties.17 Other considerations than the
wishes of the small foreign communities now began to take precedence. The Japan
market‘s potential, it was felt outside the treaty ports, was not being exploited
because of the failure to gain access to the interior.  Missionaries and others were
eager to end the restrictions on access too; many missionaries working as teachers
were for all practical purposes living under Japanese jurisdiction already and could
see little wrong with it on a day to day basis.  Japan’s modernisation programme,
which showed the country in so much more a favourable light than China, led
increasingly to an acceptance outside the treaty ports that it should be properly
acknowledged. The strength of domestic pressure within Japan, with the
development of modern political parties, was another factor.
The arrival of Inoue Kaoru at the Japanese foreign ministry in 1880 began a
Japanese attack on the unequal treaties that was ultimately successful, although not
by the means Inoue first used.  The foreign community was at first unworried by this
development. Not only was Parkes still in Tokyo, but there were clearly other allies in
the diplomatic community. Inoue’s proposals became known, for instance, when
they were leaked by the Netherlands minister to a newspaper.18
It was something of a hollow victory, for when the Japanese returned to the
negotiating table, their terms were tougher, and they grew steadily tougher as time
passed, and the foreign powers became less and less united in their approach, each
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seeing potential opportunities for increased trade or influence. As they did so, the
protection on offer to foreigners steadily drained away. Where once, Japanese
jurisdiction was to be strictly limited, and where later, foreign judges would sit on the
Japanese bench in cases involving foreigners,  by 1890, they were all gone.  The
Japanese argued that there could be no question of foreign judges and special
privileges for foreigners in a country that now had not only new legal codes on
Western lines, but a Western-style parliament as well.19
The treaty port reaction was one of fury. There were protests to the press and to the
diplomatic corps.  Japanese plans to abandon all safeguards had  became known to
J. F. Lowder, a legal adviser to the government (and hoping to become a judge
under the 1887 proposals), and he wrote to the London Times in December 1889.
There followed much frenetic activity, culminating in a large meeting in Yokohama in
September 1890, organised by Lowder, J .H.Brooke, owner of the Japan Herald,
and J. A. Fraser, a British businessman. They claimed that it was the biggest such
meeting since the days of attacks on foreigners in the 1860s. It concluded that it was
still too soon to end extraterritoriality and that by not allowing foreigners to hold land,
the Japanese were being unfair.  Resolutions were passed and despatched to
foreign ministries and chambers of commerce.
But the foreign community was not united. As was noted, the big firms avoided
becoming involved.  The other newspapers, though mostly hostile to the Japanese,
were unwilling to follow Brooke’s lead. Attempts to organise a French newspaper to
support the anti-treaty revision cause came to nothing. There was also much
Japanese hostility, and Fraser claimed to be in fear for his life. Despite all the
bravado, the movement petered out; there was not even another grand meeting.
Worst of all, perhaps, was that in the negotiations that Japan conducted with Britain
and Germany in leading to new treaties in 1894, the treaty port communities were
neither consulted nor informed.  Their views were known - the British minister, Hugh
Fraser, noted that there was much talk of the ‘good old days and Sir Harry Parkes’ -
and discounted.  Naturally enough, they protested, but nothing happened. The treaty
port voice was ignored. 20
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Eventually, the treaty ports accepted the inevitable and began to prepare for the end
of the extraterritorial system and new commercial arrangements.  When the new
treaties came into force in the summer of 1899, there was no sudden rush of arrests,
and no great change. The foreign newspapers carried on as before, as did the
general round of foreign life. But there was a bitterness that continued to sour
relations long after the end of the treaties. Foreigners continued to expect a
privileged position. Treaty revision had come too late, and after too much of a
struggle, for much goodwill on either side.21
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Ernest Satow and the Implementation of the
Revised Treaties in Japan
Nigel Brailey
A revision of the treaties with foreign Powers which should render Japan
independent in reality as well as in name has been the ambition of every statesman
who, for the last fifteen or twenty years, has occupied the post of Foreign Minister in
that country;and it is but natural to sympathise with the aspiration thus kept in view,
for until the revision of the Treaties originally forced upon her could be
accomplished, Japan could scarcely be said to have entered the comity of nations.
The treaties in effect regarded Japan as an uncivilised State, to the operation of
whose laws it was impossible to entrust the lives and liberties of Europeans and
Americans resorting to her shores.
So wrote Robert Young, owner-editor of the Kobe Chronicle, around the middle of
1897.
1
 But perhaps the best starting-point for a retrospective discussion of this topic
is my Bristol predecessor Francis Jones’s Extraterritoriality in Japan.
2
 Despite its age
it is surely the classic if not also still the standard work on the revision of the old
Western ‘unequal’ treaties with Japan. However, it presents an apparently very neat,
London Foreign Office-centric interpretation, as if, following years of hard bargaining,
everything was complete even before the arrival of Ernest Satow as British Minister
in Tokyo at the end of July 1895. The seminal so-called ‘Aoki-Kimberley’ Anglo-
Japanese Treaty had been signed a year earlier. And despite the intervening First
Sino-Japanese War, and its effect on Japan's reputation in the world, or indeed
Robert Young's comments of 1897, all that remained was to bring the treaty into
effect, along with parallel new treaties with the rest of the Western Powers.
Yet Jones does also seem to hint at growing pressure within Japan prior to 1894, for
outright repudiation of the old treaties, a pressure that might have been expected to
resume were there any threat of delay in the introduction of the new treaties, beyond
the five years that had been generally agreed as the minimum interval. What this
perhaps implies is that the process of renegotiation had been less about the
Western Powers making concessions to Japan, than their striving to keep Japan
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within the ‘comity of nations’, and preventing her trying to return to sakoku isolation,
whether or not this was a wise option for her. Also, though familiar with translated
sections of the memoirs of Count Mutsu Munemitsu, the Japanese Foreign Minister
of the early 1890s normally credited with prime responsibility on the Japanese side
for the new treaties, Jones gave most credit to Viscount Aoki Shuzo. Aoki was a
predecessor of Mutsu as Foreign Minister, 1889-91, at an important stage in the
renegotiation of the old treaties, as well as Japan's Minister in Berlin by 1894, and
general plenipotentiary treaty negotiator across Europe, who was to return as
Foreign Minister in Satow's last years in Tokyo, 1898-1900.
On 1 August 1895, as he noted in his diary, Satow had his first interview after his
return with the Japanese Minister-President or premier, Marquis Ito.
3
 He was back in
Japan for the first time in nine years, and it was more than twelve since he had left
the country after more than two decades of consular service there, but Ito was one
of the many acquaintances of his youth, if not friends.
Said that I had also to congratulate him on the conclusion of Treaty Revision.
I was glad to find on my return here that this question w[hi]ch had occupied
the two gov[ernmen]ts for so many years was out of the way. Inquired
whether the R[ussian] Treaty w[ou]ld be signed. Ito said the Emperor had
already signed the ratification, that it is on its way out, and will be exchanged
irrespective of other negotiations. Fr[ance] & Germany were holding out[,]the
former for some concessions in favour of Fr[ench] products and both of them
for the right to hold real property [estate].
And some weeks later, to a Catholic missionary friend, ‘I expressed my satisfaction
at it being a "fait accompli", w[hi]ch w[ou]ld prob[ably] give a better tone to foreign
relations. He said that it w[ou]ld have been much better in 1882 to accept the
Japanese proposals, as much that has since happened w[ou]ld have been obviated,
and I agreed with him.'
4
But if the latter points made by Ito themselves hint at prospective difficulties, Satow
was soon to become aware of some more fundamental issues that might be
considered to underlie Japanese-Western relations over the subsequent half-century
if not more. These are issues that relate to Japan's national security, and the
27
country’s acceptance in the (effectively Western) world, let alone whether it could be
accorded ‘Great Power’ status, in the context of its ongoing inclination as perceived
by Satow to withdraw into itself. But for the most part they were dealt with by Satow
as, in most respects, a friend of Japan, during the first three years of his term in
Tokyo, sufficiently to ensure that the treaties did come into effect.
Orders for Ships
In late October 1895, a Captain Balthazar Münter came to call on Satow on behalf of
Armstrongs of Elswick near Newcastle:
Gave me the following information ab[ou]t Jap[ane]se [naval-building] plans[:]
4 1st class battle-ships of 15,000 tons; 3 1st class cruisers of 7000, 4 2nd
class of 4500 like the Yoshino besides smaller craft. The cost to be [Y?]
180,000,000 each w[hi]ch the Diet w[ou]ld be asked to vote, 50,000,000
being for armaments. He wants my good word.
Replied to him that I could not tout as that w[ou]ld not be worthy of a Great
Power like England, but w[ou]ld drop a hint that the performance of the
Yoshino at the Yalu fight had pleased Engl[ish] people very much, & that if
the Jap[anese] being of the same opinion as to the superior qualities of
English-built ships, go to England for their new vessels, Engl[ish] nation will
be gratified at this mark of appreciation of what they can do. So as to let Ito
understand that I am not merely indifferent
I added to Munter that I c[ou]ld not promise to speak at any precise time, but
must watch my opportunity.
5
Satow reported to the Foreign Office that he felt Münter might have overestimated
Japanese plans,
6
 and anyhow the opportunity did not present itself until 8 February
1896:
Mentioned Ships [to Ito]. That the reason for my not mentioning the subject
[before] was that we did not like the policy of selling concessions to Japan for
advantage to ship-builders &c, but he w[ou]ld understand that of course G.B.
was pleased at the recog- nition of our superiority in that line. He replied that
we were not like other people in the former respect. He had proposals fr[om]
Germany, France, Italy & the U.S. but it was very inconvenient to be pressed
in such a matter, on w[hi]ch he was bound to take the advice of the
responsible officials.
A final comment of 6 March, deriving from an old ex-Times journalist friend turned
concessionaire was that:
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Germans are holding out for an order for an ironclad & a cruiser before they
will consent to sign the[ir] Treaty.
Münter had already advised Satow that he was convinced that the officials of the
Navy Ministry did favour British ships, and a commission which left for Europe
shortly after apparently returned to recommend purchases from Britain. In May, Sir
Andrew Noble of Armstrongs arrived to finalize the arrangements. However, in an
era when Germany in particular was emerging as a potential maritime rival, were
such commitments truly testament to ‘superior’ British workmanship as so often
presumed,
7
 rather than to political exigencies? Germany's great disadvantage was
that, as in 1939, in signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and
betraying the Anti-Comintern Pact, so in 1895, she had collaborated with St.
Petersburg in orchestrating the notorious Triple Intervention ‘slap-in-the-face’ to
Japan following her victory in her first modern war with China. Thus, as Satow noted
in his diary, these were years when so many leading Japanese were anxious to build
on the Aoki-Kimberley Treaty to the extent of securing an alliance with Britain, even
if it had to wait more than six years. And it appears that the Japanese were still
inclined to hedge their bets to the extent of ordering one cruiser from the United
States, and another from France despite dissatisfaction with an earlier French ship.
8
Colonial Treaty Adhesion & the Immigration Issue
Another issue that links with the discussions at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919,
and with the Immig-ration Bill passed by the American Congress in 1924, was that of
Japanese emigration. In the former respect, this subject has already been explored
at length by Dr Shimazu Naoko, particularly in terms of the role of Australian premier
Billy Hughes at the 1919 conference, the ‘White Australia’ policy, and the failure of
the Western powers to support an international declaration of racial equal-ity.
9
 But
discriminatory legislation against oriental im-migrants generally by even the
American Federal Govern-ment dates back to the 1870s,
10
 and it would appear to
have been precisely the issue of ‘adhesion’ to the Aoki-Kimberley Treaty that
brought the matter to a head in parts of Canada, specifically British Columbia, and in
Australia, for fear that adhesion would open them up to Japanese immigration.
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Satow himself seems to have begun with, and always have remained loyal to, the
notion that the settlement of the Americas and Australasia was one of the great
histor-ical achievements of the white man, which should not be compromised in any
way, and anyhow finder’s was keeper’s. This was despite being the father of two
boys by a Japanese woman, the elder of whom, when he became tubercular, Satow
arranged to settle near Denver, Colorado. In general, he appears to have accepted
that oriental settlers would simply not be welcome in such places.
11
 In consequence,
his initial reaction to Japanese unhappiness about efforts by the Australian States to
add restrict-ions on Japanese immigration to their signing the 1894 treaty, was to
represent it as a mere bargaining-chip in the process of launching their new
shipping-line, connecting Japan with Australia.
12
 But if this impression derived from
Komura Jutaro, currently deputy Foreign Minister, he had already had indication
enough of the attitude of Saionji Kimmochi, the acting Foreign Minister, who had ‘got
on his high horse’ about the Japanese being ‘lumped with the Chinese’, while there
were hints that the actual Minister, Mutsu, periodically sick at the time, was also
unhappy.
13
 Finally, in October 1896, Okuma Shigenobu, then Foreign Minister in the
second Matsukata government and a figure Satow was increasingly viewing as the
‘coming man’ in Japanese politics:
talked rather vehemently of the violent measures aimed at Japanese in
Australia (hidoi me ni awasete) and said that if this sort of thing were done,
Japan must be in a position to denounce the Treaty at the earliest possible
date as the Japanese national feeling would be excited: therefore he had put
in [the draft protocol about the Colonies] that either party might give 12
months notice.
Subsequently, he ‘moderated his tone, but went on about the unwisdom of Canada
and Australia with their huge territory and small population refusing to allow
immigration.’
14
 By this time, it was known that Victoria and South Australia had joined
the opposition, while Queensland and British Columbia had begun to plan res-trictive
legislation. Satow resolved to work for an adhesion ‘terminable by the Japanese at
one year's notice’, as the best of a bad job,15 but nothing was settled before his
home-leave in the summer of 1897, coinciding with Queen Victoria's Diamond
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Jubilee celebrations. These afforded him the opportunity of consultation in particular
with Sir Hugh Nelson, premier of Queensland, in company with Sir Henry Norman,
the ex-governor, while en route back to Japan in November via Canada, he visited
both the Governor-General, Lord Aberdeen, and the federal premier, Sir Wilfred
Laurier, at Ottawa. Apparently, Satow was determined to persuade himself that
outside British Columbia, Canadian unhappiness with adhesion was prompted
simply by opposition to ‘m.f.n.’ (most-favoured nation) clauses in treaties, and
Laurier indicated that Canada was simply unenthusiastic about entering into treaty
relations with Japan at all.
16
 Finally, back in Tokyo in early 1898, premier Ito declared
‘he was much troubled, annoyed ab[ou]t Australia and the Treaty’, and the question
of ‘Colonial’ adhesion was dropped. The plans for prompt legislation in Queensland
and British Columbia were also abandoned, although in British Columbia only as a
consequence of overruling by the Dominion Government.
17
 On the one hand, this left
Australian and Canadian nationals without treaty rights in Japan, while on the other,
relations with the Australian States remained strained.
18
Indian Adhesion
For that matter, there was also the issue of the ‘adhesion’ to the 1894 Treaty of
British India, which remained quite critical right up until Satow's return to England in
May 1900. As a controversy it seems to go no further back than Satow's interview
with Okuma of 15 October 1896, and not to have become critical until March 1899,
although this might perhaps have been expected. After all, this was an era in which
Japan was affording refuge to Indian nationalists, while early Japanese pan-
Asianists were beginning to view India as ripe for ‘liberation’. As early as October
1896, Satow had been writing to Salisbury of the Japanese, ‘I cannot help feeling
that they are likely to be a troublesome nation. They will take every opportunity of
manifesting their sympathy with Asiatics under the domination of Europe, and will
not shirk at intrigues of any sort with malcontents.’
19
 Economic factors may also have
helped to make direct relations with the British Raj sensitive, but Japanese amour-
propre might seem to have been the decisive factor. The Japanese discovered that
Germany and Belgium had been negotiating with Calcutta for commercial treaties,
only to withdraw on finding that they could only maintain consulates in coastal ports,
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and that the right of residence was not fully guaranteed. Thus during 1899-1900, the
Japanese Cabinet, the Privy Council and the Legislative Bureau (hosei kioku)
expressed opposition to Indian adhesion, and in fact, as early as September 1899,
Satow informed Salisbury that he was not expecting any practical outcome.
20
 Aoki
Shuzo, now Foreign Minister, is notable for applauding the metropolitan British
inclination to ‘crush race-hatred’ as he put it.
21
 But not surprisingly he was under
attack from both within his own Ministry and in the Japanese press for being willing
to accommodate British Indian demands for rights of the sort that the Japanese had
themselves just given up by the treaty of 1894. Satow saw no good reason to do
anything that might risk the survival of so generally friendly a Foreign Minister.
The Treaties of 1899
In the late autumn of 1900, after Satow's departure, Valentine Chirol, Foreign Editor
of The Times, commented quite surprisingly of Satow who considered him a friend:
from all I hear now he seems to be an exceedingly unpractical man--a scholar
no doubt, but not a man of business. One of the burning questions here
[Japan] is that of the title-deeds to property in the ex-settlements. It seems
inconceivable, but it is a fact that he accepted the wording of the Imperial
enactment regulating this matter without ever consulting our ‘nationals’ in the
settlements. They now clamour for their rights--very reasonably to my mind--
and the Japs while acknowledging that they have some grievance, contend
that what their Minister accepted they must be held to have accepted. And
the pity of it is that, had Satow taken the trouble to inform himself, he could
just as easily have obtained them a wording which would have satisfied the
settlements' people.
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However, Chirol seems not to have appeared in print with such comments. In
general, he must have appreciated Satow's continuing role in the Far East, by now
as Minister in China, having performed a swap with Sir Claude MacDonald following
the Boxer War, for he and Satow were as one in their respect for Japan and
contempt for the China of the time. But apparently in line with Chirol's comments,
what is striking about Satow's letters to Lord Salisbury, his F.O. chief, during 1898-
99, is how little reference he makes to the new treaties, but also apparently how little
interest is shown in anything he does say. Satow seems to have assumed, and to
have been given no reason to think wrongly,
23
 that the treaties and their effect
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counted little compared with London’s many other preoccupations, and he would be
best advised to work out any problems that arose without reference home. His
reports to Salisbury were therefore concerned principally with such matters as
Russo-Japanese rivalry over Korea, the fate of China, which Satow himself in
August 1899 described as ‘a corpse’,
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 and domestic Japanese politics, for instance,
the experiment in the autumn of 1898 with party government under Okuma.
Comment about implementation of the new treaties, Britain's and those of the other
Western powers, was normally restricted to brief almost throwaway paragraphs at
best.
By contrast, Satow's diaries are increasingly full of comment about the
implementation of the treaties, one particular issue being the date of implementation.
This was complicated because the French and Austrians had arranged for the 4
August, as opposed to 17 July for the other nations. Unwillingness on the part of
certain Jap-anese interests, including the prefectural governors of Osaka and Kobe,
to delay assuming control over the foreign settlements in those two cities until 4
August, produced considerable last-minute tension.
25
 But as important as anything
probably, as indicated in Satow's comments of 1 August 1895, was the question of
whether ‘foreigners’ - Satow himself always employs this word rather than
‘Westerners’ which he obviously means - should in addition to access to interior
Japan as provided by the new treaties, gain rights of landownership. Satow did
consider they should, and was able to secure the private agreement of Count Aoki.
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But Aoki was not representative even of Japanese Government opinion and knew it-
-premier Yamagata on whose support he depended to stay in office was reputedly
totally opposed--and therefore nothing could be done. Nor is it really fair to criticize
Satow for not consulting settlement opinion. During 1898-99 he was a quite frequent
visitor to Yokohama, the principal foreign settlement, where he lunched with a
committee that on occasion also comprised representatives of the other settlements.
But as he saw it, what was at stake was not merely the treaties but the continued
stability of Western relations with Japan as a whole.
On 7 September 1899, a month after the inception of the new treaties, Satow
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observed to Lord Salisbury:
Our new Treaty has 12 years to run. At the end of the 11 y[ea]rs I am
convinced the Jap[ane]se Gov[ernmen]t will give notice to terminate the Trea-
ties, & that they will enter into none after that. And they think that when they
are free fr[om] Treaty obligations, they will be able to treat foreigners as
they like.
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This is not to say that he did not suspect many Japanese of wanting to retire again
into sakoku isolation, as he was saying just days before the inception of the treat-
ies.
28
 But his diary is notable for its extensive and almost unique blanks during
August 1899, most of which he spent at ease at his holiday home beside Lake Chiu-
zenji.29 He also fails to record the Economic Association dinner arranged for 5
August for all the leading foreign diplomats to celebrate the restoration of full
Japanese sovereignty. This dinner Aoki had been discussing at length with Satow in
advance, ostensibly as the culminat-ion of a policy he personally had been pursuing
since 1889, to which Satow paid direct tribute.
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 But there are signs that the
relationship between the two men, hitherto so friendly, gradually began to sour over
the last nine months of Satow’s stint in Tokyo following the inception of the Treaties.
During these months, he was constantly pressing Aoki to ensure the full and, as he
saw it, fair implementation of the new British Treaty in the interests particularly of
British residents in Japan, but evidently to the further disadvantage of the Japanese
Foreign Minister in his relations with his colleagues.
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 There was also the continuing
ill-feeling over the question of the adhesion of India to the Treaty, and Satow began
to view Aoki as double-dealing. When finally at the end of March 1900, he confirmed
that he had been recalled from Tokyo and would not be returning, he noted in his
diary with evident disgust Aoki’s apparent lack of regret.
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 Perhaps more just were
his comments to Salisbury a couple of months earlier, that ‘British residents are not
quite reasonable, and ask for what is impracticable. On the other hand the Japanese
are not quite straightforward, and would like to wriggle out of their Treaty obliga-
tions.’
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 But as Satow's March transfer instructions indicated, for the moment, the
eyes of the world had turned to China, and it was expected that time would heal the
minor short-term difficulties arising from Japan's new treaty relationship with the
Powers.
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Satow and Extraterritoriality in Eastern Asia
A few final remarks are appropriate with respect to Satow’s attitudes to the question
of treaty renegotiation generally, and the elimination of extraterritoriality in particular.
In retirement after 1906, Satow briefly became a candidate for the chairs of
international law at Oxford and Cambridge. In some respects at least, he was a
distinctly unlikely candidate, but he reckoned that one subject he was well qualified
to teach was extraterritoial jurisdiction or extraterritoriality.34
As I have indicated elsewhere,
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 his special interest in the subject dated back at
least to September 1883, when on home-leave he composed a long and somewhat
convoluted memorandum on Japan’s relations with the Western powers, effectively
recommending acceptance of the Japan-ese proposals for ending Western
extraterritorial rights in that country. Various notable visitors to Japan in the 1870s,
Sir David Wedderburn and Sir Charles Dilke for two, had already advocated it,
36
 and
Satow’s conversion may go back to the influence of his old Japan friend A.B. Mitford,
if not that of the famous Oxford professor of Sanskrit who taught Mitford, Max Muller.
Satow’s 1883 memorandum seems to have got no further than the man he viewed at
that time as his prospective new chief in Japan, Sir Francis Plunkett. But in Bangkok
by 1885 as Minister himself, he was treating it as a kind of blueprint for the policies
he might pursue there. Siam was another Asian polity whose relations with Britain
were governed by a mid-century so-called ‘unequal treaty’, but special treaties
subsequently in 1874 and 1883, with respect to a group of Siam's northern
dependencies centred on Chiangmai, had been designed to diminish the Bangkok
Consulate's responsibility for British Indian or Burmese subjects there, and Satow
saw them as a model capable of application to the whole country.
Unfortunately for this plan, Satow's own visit to Chiangmai at the beginning of 1886,
persuaded him that the scheme had been unwise, and that the Siamese were as yet
unready to practise law in a way that would be considered satisfactory in the West.
Efforts by the Siamese to jump on the bandwagon of treaty renegotiation then slowly
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moving forward in Japan antagonized him, and by early 1889, again on leave in
England, he began to display a new hostility to it even in terms of Japan. This was in
alliance with Sir Nicholas Hannen, shortly to become Chief Justice of the
International Court at Shanghai, R.J. Rennie, and seemingly also the new Minister-
elect for Japan, Hugh Fraser, meeting with permanent officials at the Foreign
Office.
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 Satow’s own destination by then was Montevideo in Uruguay where he
stayed four years, followed by another couple in Morocco.
There is therefore an evident degree of ambivalence in his references to the Aoki-
Kimberley and other revised treaties which he found on his return to Japan in 1895
apparently already signed and sealed. As he wrote to an old friend in England
shortly before their implement-ation:
Probably years will be needed to get rid of the effects of the ‘foreign
settlement’ system, which was merely a more liberal kind of Decima
[Deshima]..A less independent class of Englishmen will succeed those who
have lived under extra-territoriality...I do not blame H.M.G. for the Treaties
they led the way in making, for I am convinced that the old system was
becoming daily more and more unworkable. But I regret its necessity.
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As the British Minister in Japan from 1895 to 1900 responsible for implementing the
‘model’ treaty signed by Lord Kimberley and Aoki Shuzo in 1894, Ernest Satow had
largely to make the best of a bad job, leaving many loose ends that were to fester
through much of the twentieth century. Far from eliminating the clash of cultures that
the original ‘unequal’ treaties of the 1850s had concealed, the new treaties brought
them out into the full light of day, exacerbated by new national passions.
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The Anglo-Japanese Treaty Revision of 1911
Ayako Hotta-Lister
The Anglo-Japanese Treaty Revision of 1911 finally achieved the almost complete
eradication of what had remained of the so-called ‘unequal treaties’ with Britain. Just
as in the previous attempts, the story of the negotiations is one of diplomatic
struggles and soul-searching between Tokyo and London spanning almost two years
including the preparation period. Just as Mutsu and Aoki had had to carry out the
negotiations for the 1894 revision in the shadow of the imminent war with China,
Komura, foreign minister, and Kato, ambassador to London, had constantly to
remind themselves of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, whose  expiry date of 1915 was
looming into view.  Moreover, this time, the task was more difficult for Japan than
before: anti-Japanese feelings had become prevalent in Britain after the Russo-
Japanese War, due mainly to the Japanese ‘closed door’ policy in Manchuria, and
foreign relationships were more complex, as evidenced in the revision of the
arbitration treaty between Britain and the USA mooted in 1910, which necessarily
entered into the minds of the Japanese negotiators, if only indirectly.  It also revealed
Japan’s maturity in carrying out effective diplomatic negotiations with Britain on an
equal footing, despite fundamental differences between Britain and Japan.  In this
study, I shall concentrate on the diplomatic side of the story, leaving other aspects of
this topic for another study.
In 1899 the Mutsu treaty of 1894 came into force. The most obvious change was the
complete abolition of extraterritoriality, which had been of direct concern to the
general public. It was generally accepted that the revision of the so-called ‘unequal
treaties’ had at last been achieved, as evidenced, for example, in the illustrious and
worthy exhibition currently being held at Yokohama Archives of History
commemorating the centenary of the implementation of treaty revision. This
interesting exhibition provides us, among other valuable information, with an
opportunity to glimpse various celebratory events held in the former treaty ports,
including an official dinner party in Yokohama on 4 August 1899, hosted by its
governor and attended by about 200 dignitaries including Yamagata, prime minister,
Saigo, home minister, and ministers representing foreign nations. Yamagata and
Saigo also attended another party of a similar nature held on the following day at the
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Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, where Aoki and Ernest Satow were also present .1
A brief survey of the treaty revision of 1894 shows that there were gains and
shortcomings. Apart from the abolition of extraterritoriality, it entirely abolished export
duty; it imposed statutory tariffs in tandem with conventional tariffs on imports; Japan
won the right to revise the tariff rates every four years; and it established that the
treaty’s duration should be twelve years, at the end of which either party could
denounce it, provided one year’s advance notice was given. It also established
reciprocal rights of residence, travel, navigation and commerce for citizens of both
countries. Its significance in terms of negotiations was that Japan had freely
negotiated an ‘equal treaty’ and, seen in a wider perspective, Japan was the first
Asian and non-Christian country to be recognized as a member of the ‘Comity of
Nations’.
The main shortcoming was that tariff autonomy had not been secured, so the next
target for Japan was to attain this in July 1911 by denouncing the 1894 treaty in the
previous July.  Although statutory tariffs were in operation, Japan was bound to give
six months notice to the Powers if they were to be changed.  The special low rates of
duty on principal goods from Britain, France and Germany were laid down in the
Schedule to the treaty, and although tariffs could be revised, Japan could not change
them at will, for the other party had to be consulted and agree to the revised tariff; in
other words, Japan could not unilaterally revise the rates.  Although there was a
minor tariff change in October 1906, Japan was still deprived of one of the basic
rights that an independent sovereign country was entitled to have.  Such a right
would have been a vital vehicle for a developing country like Japan during its first
industrialization phase.  The low tariff fixed for some goods was more in the Powers’
interests than Japan’s even after the Mutsu treaty, and this may have been partly
responsible for delaying Japan’s industrialization.  In the Commerce and Navigation
Treaty, the continuation of perpetual leases enjoyed by foreign residents and the
rights of coastal trading between most of the former treaty ports were agreed.
Furthermore, the troubled Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause was still retained.
The extraterritorial rights given to the West were regarded by the ordinary general
public as a humiliating experience, as compared with the tariff autonomy issue,
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which did not directly affect them. Accordingly, public opinion was much more
enthusiastic about the eradication of the former than the latter at the time. Interest in
the issues of trade balance by the general public had always been low.
Serious talk of treaty revision in order to attain tariff autonomy seems to have
reappeared almost immediately after the Russo-Japanese War and during the
Saionji cabinet (from early 1906 to August 1908), partly to raise revenue to help the
poor financial situation after the war, including a chronic trade deficit with Britain, and
some preliminary studies had been carried out. But, it was Komura Jutaro in
Katsura’s second term (August 1908 to August 1911) who initiated serious efforts
and carried the revisions through to a successful conclusion. Komura was well
qualified to deal with the task, not only as an experienced and able foreign minister,
but also as an acute observer of the vicissitudes of treaty revision for some decades
and a man of action in this respect.  It can be traced back to his days in the 1880s as
head of the Interpretation Department when he was involved, though indirectly, with
the previous treaty revision proposals.  Personally opposed to Inoue’s proposals, he
is said to have been about to reveal them to an ultra-nationalist group, Kankonsha
Domei, of which he was a founder member, to publicize the proposals in order to
appeal to the general public to oppose them, but stopped short of doing so due to
Tani Kanjo’s return from Europe.2  On another occasion, Komura is believed to have
passed Okuma’s proposals, which had been printed in The Times in London on 19
April 1889, to Nippon which published the whole material from 31 May for some
days. This in turn instigated nationwide opposition, culminating in the bombing attack
on Okuma.3 Komura had also helped the Mutsu treaty and while he was
Ambassador in London (from 1906 to August 1908) he is said to have studied and
mentally prepared for the forthcoming treaty revision negotiations.4 His view was
that, since Mutsu had achieved the revision of half of the ‘unequal treaties’, it was his
mission to work for the other half, the attaining of tariff autonomy and entire removal
of anything indicative of unilateral ‘unequal’ agreement so as to see Japan become a
fully independent sovereign country.5
With such high hopes, Komura returned to Tokyo from London on 27 August 1908 to
resume his second term as foreign minister in the second Katsura cabinet. For the
treaty revision, his first task was to form an effective team to undertake thorough
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preparations both at home and abroad, since, like the Mutsu treaty, negotiations
needed to be carried out abroad to avoid protests within Japan. With premier Katsura
as finance minister, he himself chaired, on 9 October, the Treaty Revision
Preparation Committee with Ishii Kikujiro, deputy foreign minister, together with able
and experienced men, including even those recalled from abroad, and Wakatsuki
Reijiro who was in charge of the statutory tariff side. As it had been decided that
negotiations with Britain were to be carried out first before other countries and
Komura had foreseen that Britain would be the hardest case of all, he seems to have
carefully considered appropriate appointments before leaving London. Komura could
appoint no-one else but Kato Takaaki as his successor, even though they had not
always been on good terms.  Komura knew that, with his excellent diplomatic skills
together with his knowledge of economics, Kato was the only man who had the
ability to deal competently with the difficult tasks ahead.  He also took the unusual
step of leaving his confidant, Yamaza Enjiro, whom Komura had initially taken with
him to London, to assist him and to keep eye on Kato, whose excessively pro-British
and free trade stance might, Komura thought, not necessarily reflect Japan’s interest
in the forthcoming negotiations. Komura knew, just as the Mutsu had, that once
Britain signed a new treaty, other Powers would follow suit.
Komura was ready and enthusiastic, with Katsura’s backing, to embark on a
thorough review of existing tariffs with the various Powers, analyzing their effects on
Japanese trade and industrial development in the past, so as to provide a basis for
new tariff proposals. He also scrutinized several government departments that dealt
with matters related to tariff revision. The Committee set general proposals first and
then individual ones for each country.  It decided that Japan would give notice of
denunciation of the existing treaties with 13 countries either on 16 July or 3 August
1910 to annul them at their expiry date in one year’s time.  Despite apprehensions
felt by some genro in case negotiations failed, Komura had one year to conclude a
new treaty while the existing treaty was still in force.6
The announcement of the revision of the new tariffs and Komura’s speech on the
proposed new tariffs was made at the 25th Diet on 2 February 1909, when he said
that there was no scope for Britain to enter into a bilateral agreement other than on
the basis of the exchange of MFN status. This caused the expected ill feeling
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amongst the British mercantile community in Japan and amongst some British
manufacturers, particularly in the fields of machinery and textiles. They lobbied the
British government, stressing that British imports to Japan would be totally destroyed
if such high tariffs were applied.7 Komura knew from past experience that it would be
the British merchants in Japan who would be most vocal in their opposition to higher
tariffs, and he thought that the Liberal government would be inclined to support their
views.
Prompted by the British reactions, Kato complained to Komura that he would not
agree to ill-treatment of an ally in such a manner and there were many who shared
this feeling, including even some sections of the press, which hitherto had attacked
Komura for his soft approach to foreign policy, but which now said that his proposals
to Britain were too harsh.8  Kato even suggested that, to tackle British press criticism,
a historical explanation of the existing tariff arrangement between the countries be
given through such media as Reuters or Captain Brinkley.9 However, Komura was
determined that Japan would have no choice but to conclude bilateral tariff
agreements with the Powers, including Britain and France. Komura had hitherto
rejected having such an agreement with the latter two, as they, together with
Germany, had been given special low tariffs on principal goods in the previous treaty.
According to the new calculations, he thought it was inevitable that new tariffs on
British goods would go up to three times or even five times the previous rates.
The fundamental problem for Japan was that, as Britain in this period had been
practising a free trade system under the Liberal government, the majority of imports
including those from Japan had been free of import duties. The main concern of
Britain in this respect was the new Japanese tariff rates while that of Japan was to
secure the principle of tariff autonomy.
The Committee proposed that statutory tariffs should be set as low as possible so
that Japan could enter into a conventional tariff only when necessary as a last resort.
Accordingly, the 26th Diet voted in March 1910 for much lower tariffs than the
previous proposal. On 21 April, the new proposal was presented to the British
government, which the Commons debated on 25 April. The opposition protested
against the high tariffs, which they argued would prohibit the exporting of goods to
44
Japan.  There was no shortage of criticism in the British press either; and even the
Alliance and the ongoing Japan-British Exhibition in London, which had been
enthusiastically promoted by Komura, fell victim to such sentiment.10  On 28 June,
Grey passed to Kato the opinion of the Board of Trade, which regarded the new tariff
as extremely high and forecast an eventual reduction of British trade with Japan.  On
15 July Britain produced an alternative proposal.  However, since neither side could
agree, Komura decided that he needed to study the British proposal and that the
negotiation should be postponed until the autumn, as it would be wise to let public
opinion cool down and, perhaps also, to let the imminent annexation of Korea pass.
On 17 July, as had been expected, Japan notified Britain and others of the
annulment of the existing treaty in one year’s time.
Kato, the man on the spot, was very sensitive to British reactions and sent a lengthy
letter to Komura on 2 August to try to persuade him to give special concessions to
Britain. Knowing Britain well, Kato emphasized that the pressure from those
concerned in Lancashire and Yorkshire as well as from various chambers of
commerce had been so intense that, if Japan was adamant not to lower the tariff, the
present Liberal government might be thrown out and be replaced by the
Conservatives, which would certainly introduce a tariff system. Kato also touched
upon the Alliance:  ‘Already, those who oppose the new tariff are strongly against the
Alliance, and they say, any renewal after its expiry would be completely out of the
question.’11 Kato’s plea seems to have come from his genuine feeling and shows his
fear of such consequences.
After a few months gap, Komura asked Kato, on 10 November, to resume the
negotiation in London: this time, however, there seems to have been a slight change
in Komura’s negotiating tactics, which were perhaps more conciliatory than
previously, although he still insisted that Japan would only accept a bilateral tariff
agreement with Britain and hoped that Britain would find a suitable way to concur.
He then gave an example of such an idea himself: ‘As the Imperial government
wishes to conclude the treaty amicably with the British government, if Britain would
pledge to keep the status quo with no import duty on the principal Japanese goods,
such as Habutae, silk textiles, lacquer ware and so on until the treaty’s expiry, Japan
would reduce the tariff on cotton textiles, woollen textiles and iron etc.’12
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Could this change be attributed to his recuperation from illness, which had lasted for
several weeks, or some other reasons?  It can be assumed that it had a lot to do with
the Alliance and that Komura’s mind must have been very active indeed during his
rest from office. It was during the period of stalemate that Japan learnt that there
might be a possibility of Britain and America revising their existing arbitration treaty in
the near future.  In September Grey informed Kato of such an idea, suggesting two
ways that Japan could adopt.13 The whole purpose of such a treaty was to avoid
Britain helping Japan by having to fight the U.S., if a war between them broke out.
Komura had always been a staunch believer in the Alliance: indeed, he was
responsible for the conclusion of the first and second Alliances in his first term in
office and regarded it as the backbone of Japanese foreign policy.  He is, however,
said to have feared for some time, perhaps since his stay in London, that, because of
the growing anti-Japanese feeling in Britain, the Alliance might not be renewed on its
expiry in 1915. Since, as had been expected, the new tariff proposal had further
aggravated such sentiment and might jeopardize Japan’s relationship, he perhaps
felt he must rescue the Alliance from falling from grace. Kato too had been strongly
warned by Chirol, the pro-Japanese foreign editor of The Times, who visited him on
28 June, of the danger of the Alliance not being renewed, having been jeopardized
by the tariff proposal.14 It is also believed that, during Komura’s absence from office,
MacDonald too had warned Katsura on 9 October of the likely fate of the Alliance.15
Whether such warnings had been effective or not, we do not clearly know, but
Katsura and Komura seem to have had so many reminders or warnings that it is
possible this induced him to take a more conciliatory approach. MacDonald was later
told by Katsura that there had been two issues affecting revision at that time, that of
formally attaining a bilateral agreement and that of negotiating tariff rates, and that, if
the former was agreed by both parties, Japan would be prepared to give Britain
substantial concessions over the latter.16
There may be another factor that might have in part contributed to Japan’s
compromising attitude to Britain.  Japan around 1910 badly needed foreign loans
particularly for the central government, municipal governments and the South
Manchurian Railway Company, all of which had displayed their impressive exhibits at
the Exhibition in London in 1910 partly aiming at, if not overtly, canvassing for
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loans.17  These loans were expected to be mainly obtained from financiers in the City
of London and, perhaps, Paris: the Japanese leaders knew that it would be unwise to
offend these countries, especially Britain unnecessarily, but the damage had already
been done in the initial tariff proposals. We could assume, therefore, that the
Japanese were perhaps obliged to amend their approach by giving favours to Britain
in order to procure much needed foreign loans.18  However, there was one important
force that Komura had to take into account: this was internal opposition from such
quarters as the Seiyukai and public opinion.  Komura knew from his past experience
that he had to conclude a satisfactory treaty with Britain, achieving nothing short of
the gaining of full tariff autonomy.
What Komura suggested in the end was, in fact, the solution that would give what
was in reality a unilateral agreement the appearance of a bilateral one by requesting
Britain to guarantee to fully support the status quo in the treaty until its expiry, in lieu
of which Japan would generously reduce tariffs on certain British goods so as not to
jeopardize the Alliance.
There were frequent meetings between them, including the second official meeting
on 16 November, each producing fresh proposals, but there was still no agreement,
mainly due to a disagreement over the order of procedure of the negotiation, namely,
Japan could not discuss tariff rates before an agreed formula was found, whereas
Britain wanted the reverse.
There were other considerations which Japan and Britain had to take into account.
For Japan, as the attaining of tariff autonomy was the ultimate aim, the negotiations
with Britain needed to be a model to guide eventual negotiations with other
countries.  Thus the leaders had to think of their likely consequences.  Britain, on the
other hand, was concerned, apart from how much Japan could reduce the tariffs,
with what effect there would be for future governments which might want to introduce
tariffs on imports, if Britain agreed to support the status quo in the treaty, in response
to Komura’s request.
Having meticulously studied treaties of this kind, including those in an international
context, Komura could point out to Britain that Britain had concluded similar treaties
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in the past.  Greece had agreed to reduce tariffs on British goods while Britain did
likewise on Greek dried raisins.  In 1898 Britain had formally promised to Belgium to
keep the status quo on Belgium imports and both parties had agreed to annul the
treaty at short notice.19
Komura was, therefore, hinting at a formula that both countries could eventually
agree on in the middle of December.  Sir Hubert Smith, the under-secretary at the
Board of Trade, agreed that Britain would maintain the status quo on the majority of
Japanese imports, if Japan would approve specially reduced tariffs on certain British
goods.  In addition, a provision, which had initially been suggested by Kato to Smith,
was to be added that either party could, if it wished, revise tariffs after one year from
the signature, giving an advance notice of 6 to 12 months to revise or nullify the
tariffs.  This provision was significant because, fortunately for Komura, it meant that
one year after the signature, Japan was free to decide whether to annul the tariff
treaty or revise it: it was just as good as gaining full tariff autonomy.20
Having agreed the formula, both sides refined the proposals including tariff matters
from the rest of December to the middle of January 1911 when Kato presented Grey
with the final and much reduced tariff proposals for both statutory and conventional
tariffs, the difference in rates of which had been kept as small as possible.
However, Japan asked Grey to keep it secret for the time being as the new tariff had
been much in Britain’s favour and Komura feared that, hearing of such special
treatment being given to British imports by Japan, other countries might take
advantage of it.21 Grey and the president of the Board of Trade explained the
Japanese proposals to the cabinet on 6 February, recommending them to be
accepted.
Komura, meanwhile, in response to Grey’s inquiry of September on the arbitration
treaty, rejected his suggestions, replying on 17 January that the Alliance should be
outside the influence of the arbitration treaty.  He then boldly proposed to renew the
Alliance and extend it for a further 10 years. With the treaty revision with Britain near
conclusion, Komura might have felt confident that at least it would no longer obstruct
the negotiations for the renewal of the Alliance, which he seems to have been
anxious to conclude in view of the changes since the last treaty such as the British
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attitude towards the Alliance, the annexation of Korea and the treaties with Russia.
The renewal of the arbitration treaty provided Japan with such an opportunity.  He
certainly told MacDonald that the Alliance should be renewed as soon as the
arbitration treaty was signed.22 From 20 March 1911 onwards, Japan and Britain
were, therefore, working on both the Anglo-Japanese treaty revision and the renewal
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, though the former was on the verge of signature and
the latter was not to be concluded until 13 July.
Being relieved that the main and most difficult part of the treaty revision had been
amicably settled, both sides started to work on the other part, the Commerce and
Navigation Treaty.  The main differences from the previous treaty were that Japan
abolished the rights of coastal trading by Britain, except for passengers and cargo
with ‘through-bill-of-lading’, between former treaty ports; the purchase of property
and land was allowed, based on the country’s law for foreigners, under the MFN
privilege; the trade mark ownership clause was abolished and there were some other
minor points.  However, the initial proposal to replace the perpetual lease by land
ownership rights took a long time to negotiate, due mainly to disagreement on the
amount of compensation given to the owners of leases, and the perpetual lease
problem was not finally to be settled until 1937.
The British cabinet endorsed the new Japanese tariff proposals on 8 February 1911.
Meanwhile, the U.S.-Japanese treaty was successfully concluded on 21 February,
even before the treaty with  Britain.  Kato and Smith worked on the wording of the
treaty until 3 March, when the final session was held.  Both parties agreed and got
ready to sign the two treaties on 3 April.  It was ratified on 5 April by Komura and
Rumbold, published on 6 May, and implemented on 17 July 1911, the day after the
expiry of the Mutsu treaty, thus accomplishing the treaty revision well in advance of
the deadline.  Other countries followed suit to agree revised treaties with Japan: in
May and June, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, followed by France in August.
Some countries concluded treaties at later dates following temporary treaties (modus
vivendi), such as Italy, Denmark, Holland and Austria between 1912 and 1917,
Belgium in 1924, and Portugal as late as 1932.
Japanese reactions to the tariff treaty with Britain were, on the whole, favourable.
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However, there were some criticisms by the Japanese press and the parliamentary
opposition. They regarded it as an unsatisfactory treaty, since there was still a
unilateral element: while Japan reduced tariffs generously on British imports, Britain
gave Japan virtually nothing in return. In Britain, except for opposition in some
quarters, the treaty was generally welcomed by people in many sectors, as Japan
had generously reduced the rates on British goods.
Now that this brief study of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese treaty revision is concluded, it
is time to assess the treaty and, as this was the last of such treaty revisions, perhaps
to give an overview of the whole story, a story that almost dominated the whole of the
Meiji period. Firstly, from the diplomatic point of view, it was, I believe, a triumphant
tribute to the efforts of Komura, Kato and Yamaza. It was Komura’s insistence on
holding on to his principles and his idea of a nominally bilateral agreement that had
led to the insertion of the crucial provision. Just as evidenced at the Peking
Conference in 1900 and the Portsmouth Peace Conference in 1905, his
determination to get what he had aimed at, if not fully, due to circumstances beyond
his control, earned him a prestige and a reputation as a skilful negotiator. However,
when a new government came to power in Britain, there was no attempt to overturn
the existing treaty and even during the First World War, Habutae etc. were spared
from import restrictions. Japan likewise did not change the tariff on British goods until
1918, after the War.23
Kato also played an important role in concluding the new treaty, though he might
have been excessively influenced by British public opinion, by Grey and by Chirol of
The Times, as Komura had feared.  However, Kato was well aware of his duty, as
evidenced in his forceful suggestion to Chirol in July 1910 that, as an ally of Japan,
Britain, in particular, had an obligation to assist Japan to attain tariff autonomy. Just
like Aoki before him, Kato seems to have been often frustrated by being in the
middle between both governments, particularly as he understood both views well:
sometimes he sounded almost desperate.  Yamaza, his subordinate, worked hard on
the revision to assist Komura and keep an eye on Kato, as instructed, as well as
acting on behalf of Kato who was often absent.
Secondly, just as at the time of the Mutsu treaty, internal and external pressures, as
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well as other diplomatic issues, influenced both sides of the negotiations.  Komura
was accused of giving too many concessions to Britain because of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, just as was Mutsu, because of the imminent war against China.
MacDonald was one of those who certainly thought so, as evidenced in his letter to
Grey saying that, if the Alliance had not been renewed until its expiry date, the
Japanese government might not even have denounced the existing arrangement
and might not have given tariff concessions to Britain and that ‘…the uncertainty of
renewal of the Alliance would be a useful lever and also check any unnecessarily
forward policy’.24 Tokyo Nichi Nichi concluded similarly, saying that the tariff
concessions should be regarded as a victim of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.25 Hara
Kei commented on Komura’s dilemma during the negotiation: ‘…it was nothing but
his [Komura’s] aspiration for honour that made him pursue the achievement of tariff
autonomy which had led him to such a difficult situation’.26  Komura and Katsura
were not impervious to what Kato, MacDonald, Grey, the press and opposition had to
say after all.  Komura, however, had to keep the concessions that Japan gave to
Britain secret during the Diet session in January 1911 when he was asked about the
progress of the negotiation by the opposition, and Grey had been asked to be
similarly circumspect.
Grey too seems to have been working under pressure, to a limited extent, from
strong opposition to the initial Japanese proposal expressed by the Board of Trade,
the mercantile community and manufacturers, the Tariff Reform League and the
press, which sometimes threatened to bring the opposition party in, particularly
during the election campaigns in this period.
As the Anglo-Japanese treaty revision of 1911 was the last in a series of revisions of
the 1858 original treaty, it is worth reflecting here on the turbulent story of the
struggle to achieve treaty revision, spanning more than half a century.  On the whole,
with the benefit of hindsight, we could say, such a lengthy struggle paid off or, at
least, there was more benefit than loss in the balance sheet in the long term.
For Meiji Japan, the negative effects of the so-called ‘unequal treaties’ were
enormous. The judicial system of extraterritoriality had been of much more direct
concern to the general public than regaining tariff autonomy. Mentally, an enormous
51
humiliation felt by the awakening public, particularly after the failure of negotiations
and such incidents as the Hartley and the Normanton, a passenger ship, partly
fanned by the press, brought chaos to successive governments and foreign
ministers, even going so far as to injure Okuma.  As for the tariff issue, Japan’s
industrialization is said to have been delayed by low tariffs unilaterally fixed by the
Powers, preventing the nurturing of needed industries.
However, if we look at the positive side, the benefits seem to outweigh the
disadvantages.  Firstly, the humiliation felt by the Japanese was so strong that it
gave them the mental strength to overturn it.  It was similar to their mental fight
(Gashin Shotan) after the humiliating Triple Intervention, if to a smaller extent. The
positive side of extraterritoriality was that, by being confined within the treaty ports,
foreign residents were restricted in their activities, thus Japan was spared their
penetration throughout Japan. Secondly, such treaties hastened Japan’s
modernization in all fields, including reforms of jurisdiction and democratization.  As
the leaders had learnt early on, in order to revise such a treaty and, even more so, to
survive in a predatory world, Japan had to modernize: this meant introducing
sweeping Westernization in all aspects of Japanese life.  As the Western powers had
been observing Japan’s modernization, their attitudes towards Japan had changed,
and they gradually recognized that there was no way that such unequal treaties
could continue in a country that had so rapidly progressed from its backwardness
earlier on.  Thirdly, Japan’s growing aspiration to be treated by the Powers as an
equal partner after the Sino-Japanese War and the abolition of extraterritoriality
hastened her industrialization further, particularly in heavy industry. Japan’s rapid
modernization in all spheres reached the stage to equip her to win the war with
Russia and also to be able to take advantage of the opportunity given by the First
World War.  More significantly, the efficiency and competence shown during and after
the Boxer Rising and Britain’s recognition of Japan’s ability in respect of her naval
strength partly ushered in an alliance with Japan. By 1910, Britain and the other
Powers could no longer ignore Japan’s aspiration to become a fully independent
sovereign country by annulling the old treaties and they had no choice but to agree
new treaties on an equal footing, as Japan had long wished. Fourthly, we could say
that the long story of treaty revision was also one of endurance and of gradual
maturity in Japanese diplomacy, culminating in the 1911 treaty revision, which was,
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perhaps, one of the last examples of diplomatic negotiations with the Powers that
Japan had undertaken in a civilized way in the first half of the twentieth century
before her various disastrous diplomatic relationships with the Powers which
followed later on.  Lastly, as Japan was the first non-Christian country to accomplish
successful negotiations on equal terms with the Powers, this treaty might have
shown other countries the way ahead, just as Japan’s victory over Russia sent a
message worldwide to many colonized or semi-colonized countries.  In a world
context, these examples might be the best contribution that Japan could provide for
emulation by existing, or embryonic, nations in the future.
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